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Abstract 
Investor-state arbitration, also called investment arbitration, is often accused of harming developing states facing economic hardship, for the benefit of a wealthy few from the Global North. Its proponents respond that it is the only available means to resolve disputes impartially, and that its increased use clarifies international law. In this article, the authors investigate the empirical manifestations of the uses and functions of investment arbitration, with an original dataset that compiles over 500 arbitration claims from 1972 to 2010. The study reveals that until the mid-to-late nineties, investment arbitration was mainly used in two ways. On the one hand, it was a neocolonial instrument to strengthen the economic interests of developed states. On the other, it was a means to impose the rule of law in non-democratic states with a weak law and order tradition. But since the mid-to-late nineties, the main function of investment arbitration has been to provide guideposts and determine rights for investors and host state, and thus to increase the predictability of the international investment regime. In doing so, however, it seems to favor the “haves” over the “have-nots”, making the international investment regime harder on poorer than on richer countries.

1	Introduction
A backlash is raging against investment arbitration.​[1]​ The wrath of those preoccupied by the fate of developing nations is fuelled by a perception that investment arbitration is a powerful sword in the hands of the economic interests of rich, developed states, which use it to harm weaker economies of poorer, developing states. Actors from within the system object that the number of investment claims continues to rise and that, as a consequence, investment arbitration must fulfill some useful societal function. The ships, of course, are passing in the night here. As a consequence the battleground often moves to individual cases, which are criticized or praised or excused. This is admirable and exciting and makes the headlines, but it tells us little about what we should think, in the grander scale of things, about investment arbitration, which is what matters when it comes to backlash stories. 
At the level of theory, we can easily mark out a few bottom-line roles or functional effects of arbitration. For some it is a vehicle for domination that ‘followed in the wake of foreign invasion and occupation’​[2]​ and ‘imposes a “neoliberal rule of law” that promises predictability and certainty at the expense of democratic politics’.​[3]​ It would really be an example of neo-colonialism. For others, investment arbitration promotes ‘democratic accountability and participation ..., good and orderly state administration and the protection of rights and other deserving interests’.​[4]​ Here the view has the hallmark of rule-of-law ideals, which are being fostered in the state hosting the investment. By another reckoning, ‘[t]hrough publicly available and widely studied awards, investor-State arbitral tribunals are helping to define specific principles of global administrative law and set standards for States’.​[5]​ The idea of rule-of-law ideals is still there, but the focus is more squarely on the international level, beyond individual unruly states. Clearly, these are root-and-branch differences of view about what investment arbitration does in fact achieve, and thus of its moral-political estimableness.
Perhaps surprisingly, it is seldom asked whether these and kindred theories are plausible in view of empirical evidence. There admittedly is a burgeoning literature on investment flows and treaties,​[6]​ but our focus is specifically on the arbitration aspects of the situation: is there statistically significant evidence to corroborate concerns about the functional effects of investment arbitration? Or to contradict them? To what extent and in what respect do the drivers of the backlash comport with reality? In this study we seek to provide some empirical large-scale evidence on these questions, drawing on the analysis of a set of 541 investment arbitration claims filed between 1972 and 2010. 
	As we take such an approach, a caveat must be first entered: there clearly are limitations to large-scale empirical studies, on investment arbitration just as on any other legal question. The criticism has already been made that such approaches ‘reduce complex social and legal phenomena to numbers and equations’.​[7]​ With empirical methods, we only achieve fragmentary knowledge, which tends to reinforce or weaken intuitions we already have. We should be wary of drawing from what we see as unqualified conclusions about what there really is. And indeed pioneering empirical works on investment arbitration have been castigated for overreach in their conclusions: one prominent study extended quite specific findings – lack of statistical relationship between development status of presiding arbitrators or host countries with outcome – to an unwarranted ‘powerful narrative that there is procedural integrity in investment arbitration’ and to the conclusion that ‘the investment treaty arbitration system, as a whole, functions fairly’.​[8]​ To be sure, the point of empirical studies is not to assert, en bloc, that investment arbitration is fair or unfair, biased or unbiased, commendable or deplorable. Greater specification and focus are indispensable in selecting hypotheses for empirical examination. 
We consider three main hypotheses about the functional effects of investment arbitration. They form three models or candidate-theories of the functions that investment arbitration may empirically have: (1) investment arbitration serves to champion and strengthen the interests of economic powers of developed states to the detriment of political powers of developing states, in a form of neo-colonialism; (2) investment arbitration serves to make up for deficient rule of law in the host state; and (3) investment arbitration serves to strengthen the international rule of law. 
Our data tend to support the following hypotheses: investment arbitration appears to have been used as a replacement for dysfunctional domestic courts in countries with a weak rule of law tradition until the mid-to-late 1990s, but since then it seems to have served this function increasingly less; in parallel, investment arbitration appears to have been used, until the mid-to-late 1990s, as a sword in the hands of the economic interests of investors from rich countries against governments of poorer countries, but has since then also been used significantly by investors from rich countries against other rich governments. And so the overall picture of investment arbitration seems to have changed in the mid-to-late 1990s, when the system shifted from what may best be described as a neo-colonial instrument to an instrument that on the whole appears (appears, hedging is apposite here) to promote the international rule of law. Reservations, however, are appropriate about the extent to which this latter function is really carried out.
This article moves in four parts. After a brief presentation of our dataset (2), it provides empirical considerations of the three functions of investment arbitration mentioned above: that is, whether it can be seen as a ‘neo-colonial’ instrument to serve the economic interests of developed states (3), or as an instrument to remedy the problem of an ineffectual rule of law in the host state (4), or as an instrument to further the international rule of law (5).

2 The Dataset
Our study draws on a dataset of 541 investment arbitration claims, filed between 1972 (the year the first investment claim was filed with ICSID​[9]​) and 2010. The unit of analysis used here is claims – not awards, since certain claims end in a negotiated agreement or are withdrawn, and not cases, since that concept has a greater definitional ambiguity. 
We deal with investment arbitration or investor–state arbitration, and thus go beyond investment treaty arbitration: the dataset includes claims filed on the basis of a treaty, of a contract, or of the domestic investment law of the host state of the investment. Approximately 67 per cent of the 541 claims are based on a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), 13 per cent on a contract between the host state and the investor, 12 per cent on a free trade agreement (North American Free Trade Agreement (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​North_American_Free_Trade_Agreement​) (NAFTA), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), United States–Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)), 5 per cent on the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), and 3 per cent on the domestic legislation of the host state. 
The study covers claims filed under the rules of all relevant arbitration institutions (mainly the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)), as well as ad hoc arbitrations (primarily conducted under the rules of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Approximately 60 per cent of claims are ICSID claims and about 30 per cent are UNCITRAL claims. 
Based on the experience of the first author and on informal consultations with other researchers and practitioners, this universe of claims appears to be reasonably close to a complete picture of all investment arbitrations filed during that period. It seems reasonable to estimate that no more than 10 per cent of the existing investment claims are missing in our dataset: after all, few such cases remain entirely secret. 
These 541 claims were encoded in the dataset according to the year in which they were filed. Figure 1 shows the evolution of claims filed between 1972 and 2010. It is noteworthy, even if already well known, that the number of claims filed annually significantly increased starting in the mid-to-late 1990s. That period is correlated, as we will see, to certain functional changes in the system. 


Fig. 1: Number of investment arbitrations claims filed per year.

The sources of the data collected were as broad as possible, trading heightened reliability and accuracy for scope and statistical relevance. The dataset includes all cases about which information was found either directly in an award, or indirectly in other datasets and reports of law firms and of specialized journalists.​[10]​ 

3 Neo-colonialism
A first account of the functional effects of investment arbitration may be referred to as neo-colonialism. An alternative, more fashionable designation is to call it the neo-liberal straightjacket view. The idea is that what investment arbitration really does is help (richer) developed and emerging countries to regulate the activities of (poorer) developing countries regarding foreign investments. Investment arbitration is seen as a one-way street, a vector of the exploitation of poor countries by rich countries. As a conference delegate put it in 1957, it ‘allow[s] private investors to dominate the economic, if not political, affairs of underdeveloped nations’.​[11]​ It is neo-colonial in that its purpose is to allow developed countries to exercise control over and exploit developing countries. The economic interests of investors from richer countries are promoted to the detriment of the regulatory freedom of governments in poorer countries – hence the idea of the straightjacket. 
A bit of history helps put this idea into context: A major challenge for the global economic order after World War II was to deal adequately with claims for redress made by former colonies in Asia and Africa, joined by older Latin American countries. These states wanted to end (and sometimes get revenge for) the real or perceived economic exploitation from the former northern colonial powers. The instrument to achieve it was expropriation – a manifestation of sovereignty and of the New International Economic Order of the time. Naturally, there was a reaction to that movement: investment arbitration.​[12]​ Hence, as Gus Van Harten puts it, ‘While investment treaty arbitration is unique, one should not lose sight of its ancestry or fact that early international arbitrations of investment disputes sometimes followed in the wake of foreign invasion and occupation’.​[13]​ Investment treaties are likened to colonial legal regimes and investment arbitral tribunals are analogized to imperial courts and foreign consuls.​[14]​
There is also a more indirect account of this role of investment arbitration. It proceeds in two stages. First, the investment arbitration system is shown as seeking primarily, if not exclusively, to maximize the protection of the investor.​[15]​ The system would be skewed in favour of investor protection. As Anne van Aaken puts it, ‘It seems fair to say that tribunals have been on the whole rather investor friendly, often explicitly stating that the object and purpose of the BIT was (only) the protection of the investor. In the view of some tribunals, BITs are instruments for the maximization of investor protection; accordingly, uncertainties concerning ambiguous treaty provisions should be resolved in favour of foreign investors’.​[16]​ David Schneiderman is even more radical: the ultimate objective of investment arbitration, he says, is to ‘assign. . .  to investment interests the highest possible protection’.​[17]​ Even before the ICSID Convention came into force, a review of the investment protection mechanisms envisaged at the time, including investment arbitration, found that ‘[m]ost proposals are one-sided. They provide for the protection of the investor’s interest without attempting to safeguard the host state.’​[18]​ 
The second stage of the account builds on the assumption that foreign investors are predominantly from rich, developed states, and to a lesser extent from strong emerging economies, and commit capital in poorer, developing states, whose governments they then sue.​[19]​ By maximizing investor protection, investment arbitration maximizes the protection of the economic interests of ‘neo-colonial’ powers, that is, of countries with a high level of economic development. 
But is this true? Two empirical manifestations of such neo-colonialism would in this case be likely. First, if the dominating function of the investment arbitration system is indeed to allow developed countries to exercise control over and exploit developing countries, then one would expect to see the following: investment arbitration would be directed by investors from developed countries against governments of developing countries. The hypothesis of the neo-colonial function is plausible, for instance, if a large part of arbitration claims is filed by investors from developed countries against governments of developing countries. 
Secondly, if the claim that investors dominate the system is correct, and furthermore if it is correct that the system serves to maximize the protection of investors from developed countries, then one would expect to see investors bulk large in the outcomes; they should win a large share of the cases. Or let us reverse the statement: if we see a dominance of investors from developed countries in the outcomes, then – at least then – the neo-colonial accounts are plausible. 
One clarification and two caveats are in order. The clarification is that such findings would say strictly nothing about any perception of bias, which is a different question altogether, and possibly a more important one from the point of view of the political viability of the system, which calls for its own distinct remedies.​[20]​
The first caveat is that host states are in principle respondents in investment arbitration. They act as claimants in less than 1 per cent of the cases, and accordingly we consider such situations to be statistically irrelevant.​[21]​ As a general rule, host states seek to obtain from the tribunal a decision of non-liability for compensation or damages.​[22]​ They only win in defence. In and of itself, this is a significant element of asymmetry in the system. But that asymmetry is not terribly relevant: as José Alvarez puts it, one justification for it is that it ‘compensate[s] [investors] for exposure to the host State as contract party, regulator, sovereign and judge by having a forum for disputes that is not controlled by the host State. The apparent asymmetry of investment treaties is thus nothing but the reverse mirror image of the investor’s exposure to the host state’s [sovereign regulatory power].’​[23]​
	The second caveat is more troublesome. Again in José Alvarez’s words, ‘A win record of [x percent] for investor tells us nothing whether, objectively, investors deserved to win these cases or only half as many’.​[24]​ The point is taken, but it raises an important question of feasibility. Determining the rightful winner of a case requires a detailed knowledge of the particulars of the case, including its precise facts, which may differ from the facts as described by the tribunal in its decision. Even the deplorable character of the legal reasoning of certain cases is not perforce an indication that the outcome was wrong, so even a review of egregious cases is inconclusive in this regard.​[25]​ A partial solution to this difficulty is embraced by a current qualitative project conducted by Michael Waibel and Yanhui Wu:​[26]​ they determine the legal strength of a select number of cases based on the opinion of a panel of five practitioners with an immediate knowledge of the case. (To be precise, they test the straightforwardness of the legal issues of the cases, but neither the clarity of the facts nor the compelling character of the evidence.) But this solution appears hardly realistic for a set of 541 claims, some of which are 40 years old. Between discarding studies based on winning rates entirely and taking them with a grain of salt, we favour the latter: such studies appear more valuable for the approximate determination of facts than general perceptions (not that perceptions are less important, but they form a distinct problem), in particular if we can report evolutions over time of success rates.

A Geometry of Claims
Let us consider the question of the geometry of the claims: what is the development status of investors and host states? How do they relate to each another?
	It is true, as the neo-colonial hypothesis would predict, that most investment arbitrations are filed by investors from developed states: Fig. 2 shows that the home state of the investor is in 88 per cent of cases ranked, in the year of filing, as a high income country according to the World Bank metric.​[27]​ In a further 9 per cent of the cases, it is an upper-middle income country.​[28]​ In only 3 per cent of the cases is the home state of the investor a middle-income, lower-middle income, or low-income country.


Fig. 2: Number of investment arbitration claims filed per year, by development status of investor's home state.

	Contrary to the neo-colonial hypothesis, however, cases are not systematically filed against developing countries. Figure 3 shows that nearly half of the cases are brought against states that were, in the year the claim was filed, either high-income or upper-middle income states on the World Bank scale. In other words, nearly half of the 541 investment claims we reviewed, filed between 1972 and 2010, were filed against developed countries.​[29]​ 


Fig. 3: Number of investment arbitration claims filed per year, by development status of host state.
The position of developed and developing countries in the arbitration system veered in fact in the mid-to-late 1990s. Until then, investment arbitration was indeed a ‘rich vs poor’, ‘developed vs developing’ instrument, therefore arguably serviceable for neo-colonial purposes. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, however, investment arbitration has been a mixed ‘developed vs developed’ and ‘developed vs developing’ instrument, with a slight preponderance of ‘developed vs developed’ cases. This shift in geometry tends to undermine the neo-colonial argument for the period after the mid-to-late 1990s. When the system gets traction, in the second half of the 1990s (recall Fig. 1), it becomes used more often to settle disputes among developed countries than to settle disputes between an investor of a developed country and a government of a developing country.
	As evidence of this shift, consider that almost every year since 1997 investors from developed states have filed more cases against other developed states than against developing states (Fig. 4). In order to keep the charts readable, we consider that high income and upper-middle income countries (according to the World Bank metric, determined in the year of filing) represent developed states, while lower-middle income and low-income countries represent developing states.​[30]​ 

Fig. 4: Percentage of claims filed per year, by developed/developing pairs
(three year moving average).

	The shift of positions of developed and developing countries, however, is not a reversal of roles: investors from developing countries almost never file arbitration claims against governments of developed states: the highest percentage of such claims, out of the total number of claims filed in a given year, is 3 per cent in 2001 and 2002. There has been no ‘revolt’ of ‘former colonies’ against ‘former colonialists’. As Figure 4 shows, while investors from developed states file a lower percentage of their cases against developing states than before the investment arbitration boom of the mid-to-late 1990s, investors from developing states have not taken up that sword against developed host states. If we look at investment arbitration from a specific developed vs developing perspective, it very much remains a one-way street. 
	Notice, moreover, that our data do not support the idea that investment arbitration is extending to developing vs developing relations. As Figure 4 shows, investors from developing states very rarely file arbitrations against governments of developing states. The shift of the system is this: it was a developed vs developing instrument; it now is a developed vs developed/developing instrument.
A word of caution is appropriate with regard to the development status of the investor’s home state, because of the malleability of the investor’s nationality. We classify the investor’s home state, in the World Bank categories of economic development, according to the investor’s nationality. That nationality, in turn, we directly take over from determinations made in the arbitrations. The problem is that these determinations, and the ensuing classification in the World Bank metric, are vulnerable to legal manipulation of the investor’s ‘real’ economic nationality by corporate structuring (also called treaty shopping or nationality planning).​[31]​ However, we estimate that such manipulations represent a very limited number of cases. And in any event, corporate structuring is an intricate process, many aspects of which are not public. Second-guessing nationality determinations made by arbitral tribunals in order to test their statistical significance would require a full-scale separate study. 
All in all, while the neo-colonialist argument may seem to fit with the data about the geometry of claims for the period preceding the mid-to-late 1990s, it does not seem to fit for later periods.

B Outcomes
Let us move beyond initiation dynamics and consider the outcomes of the arbitrations. When we entertain that question, we must keep in mind the limitations of such an approach, as we said as the outset of this main section: We only know whether a given case was won and by whom or if it settled. Who should objectively have prevailed in any given case is not ostensible and apprizing ourselves of the real legal strength of every case would hardly be feasible. So we are ignorant of the benchmark of rightful winners and of departures from the benchmark. Nevertheless, an examination of outcomes of arbitrations and of trends therein over the last 40 years may be taken, with a grain of salt, as a useful complement to other investigations inasmuch as it corroborates or weakens the findings of such other investigations.
	The neo-colonial perspective, more specifically in its two-stage variant (recall: the system seeks predominantly to maximize the protection of investors and investors are from neo-colonial powers), is congruent with an expectation that investors rather dominate in the outcomes, and win a rather large proportion of cases. The greater the share of cases that investors win, the more such a finding adds to the plausibility of the neo-colonial hypothesis. Uneven winning rates of investors and host states, if investors clearly have the upper hand, may be construed as support for the neo-colonial perspective.
	A win in arbitration may be defined in at least two ways, one a legal definition, the other an attempt to compensate for the asymmetry of roles in the investment arbitration system. The straightforwardly legal, and more conservative, definition focuses on the first final award in the arbitration, disregarding possible subsequent challenges and annulments. A win by the investor is, then, an arbitral decision awarding the investor compensation or damages, regardless of the amount awarded. A win by the host state is an arbitral decision that either declines jurisdiction or denies the investor any compensation or damages. We do not count as host state victories proceedings that were discontinued (17 instances), nor proceedings that never began (20 instances), since both of them may in fact reflect either that the parties settled or that the claimant dropped the case without obtaining anything in return. We will call this the legal definition of a win.
	The alternative definition of a win considers that a claim has in fact petered out when it ends in damages or compensation representing only a small part of what was sought. We regard the host state as having prevailed when the investor obtains less than 25 per cent of what it claimed. So now, for an investor, arbitration success is an arbitral decision awarding it 25 per cent or more of the figure it has claimed. For a host state, winning is obtaining an arbitral decision that either declines jurisdiction, or denies the investor any compensation or damages, or awards the investor damages or compensation representing less than 25 per cent of the claim. We call this the legal-economic definition of a success.
	The legal-economic definition of a win, however, should only be used as an additional indicator of limited authoritativeness, useful only in its complementarity with other indicators. Indeed, claimants can ask for more upfront in order to factor in an expected ‘discount’ applied by arbitral tribunals. In practice, such strategies can be controlled for only with great difficulty, if at all. 
	Regardless of the definition used, investors cannot in fact boast victory in significantly more cases than host states, in particular since the end of the 1990s. Our data on arbitration outcomes do not contribute to the plausibility of the neo-colonial perspective after the late 1990s. Even with a conservative, legal definition of a win, we find that investors do not win massively more cases than host states (Fig. 5). On the whole investors have in fact won fewer cases (87 cases in the 1972–2010 period) than host states (102 cases in the same period).​[32]​ 

	
Fig. 5: Winning rates, by year of filing (five-year moving average).​[33]​

The nosedive of investor wins in recent years should be taken with an additional grain of salt. Host states may win cases more quickly than investors, by having the claim kicked out at the earlier stage of jurisdiction, whereas investors need to go all the way to a decision on the merits in order to secure a win. Accordingly, more recent claims are more likely to produce an outcome that is a win for the host state than to produce an outcome that constitutes a win for the investor, simply because of the time needed to produce these two types of outcomes.
	If we shift to the legal-economic definition of success (recall: fault line at 25 per cent of the claim), we see that since the end of the 1990s host states have generally won almost half of the cases filed against them (Fig. 5). Here again, our chart shows a progressive shift in winning rates occurring between 1997 and 2002, at roughly the same time as the system changed from a ‘developed vs developing states instrument’ to a ‘developed vs developed/developing states mechanism’. The distribution of winning rates and their shift starting in the late 1990s, considered in conjunction with the change in initiation dynamics, contributes to the plausibility that the functional effects of investment arbitration shifted towards the end of the 1990s: the neo-colonial flavour of the system started to fade.
	Let us now consider settlements. As shown in Figure 6, claims that settle without an arbitration award have amounted to roughly 30 per cent of all concluded claims. This is quite a significant number of cases. A limitation applies however: with regard to the last few years, the settlement rates are likely to be increasingly over-representative as we advance in time, because claims have a comparatively higher chance, within a shorter period of time, of ending in a settlement than of being decided by a tribunal. (For instance, a case concluded within 18 months, even two years, of filing was more likely settled than decided.) However, this time effect should be relatively limited, given that we use an eight-year moving average in Figure 6.

	
Fig. 6: Percentage of arbitrations that settled, by year of filing 
(eight-year moving average).​[34]​
	
	The meaning of settlements is not straightforward with regard to the power play between the parties. A settlement does not by necessity mean, and arguably it often does not mean, that the outcome is an equal split between the parties, that in these cases the system favoured neither of the parties. For now, let us merely take note of their statistical magnitude. We will return to settlements when discussing the international rule of law: settlements are, in their contrariness to adjudication, instances of non-operativeness of the rule of law, since no legal rule is applied, properly speaking, to resolve the dispute.

4	Substituting for the Rule of Law in the Host State
The second account of the functional effects of investment arbitration is that it serves to make up for deficient rule of law in the host state. The rule of law is taken, here, in the meaning of Rechtsstaat (law state), which in a nutshell means that the government wields its power through law and in accordance with the law.​[35]​ It is a principle of legality in the acts of the state.​[36]​ With regard to courts, it means application of the law in competent and impartial adjudication. The functional effect of investment arbitration is, here, to replace ‘dysfunctional’ courts in ‘unreliable’ countries.​[37]​ 
Two clarifications are in order. First, by ‘dysfunctional’ is meant courts in the host state that have limited respect for the rule of law, that allow or support arbitrary and unpredictable interference of their government with an investment. In substituting foul play in domestic litigation with hypothetically non-dysfunctional international adjudication, investment arbitration seeks to improve the regulatory quality of investment protection in the host state, bringing it to firmer adherence with the rule of law.​[38]​ 
Secondly, ‘unreliable countries’ refers to states that are in less than full adherence with the principle of legality and thus, arguably, with the pacta sunt servanda principle (in a broad, not strictly contractual meaning) in their relations with investors. Put bluntly, the idea is that a government defrauds an investor and its courts back it up, which calls for international arbitration to replace the courts.
Investment arbitration is here akin to administrative​[39]​ or constitutional​[40]​ adjudication, used when such adjudication is deficient in the host country. The investment arbitration system is meant to make up for the failures of national courts, injecting legality where it is wanting because of the dysfunctional character of the adjudication system in place: it seeks to provide the rule of law that national courts fail to provide in certain countries. Hence the claim, mentioned near the outset of this article, that investment arbitration is an instrument serviceable for ‘democratic accountability and participation ..., good and orderly state administration and the protection of rights and other deserving interests’.​[41]​ By ruling on the compatibility of the exercise of public powers with treaty or contract obligations, with domestic or international law, investment arbitration contributes to preventing undue interferences with investments – interferences in breach of the rule of law. 
The hypothesis is that such interferences with investments are more likely to be  committed by states with unstable legal and political infrastructures.​[42]​ Investment claims would consequently be more likely to be directed against states with unstable legal and political infrastructures. The target of the arbitration system would for the most part be non-rule-of-law, non-democratic states with governments submitted to little or no control by their own courts. Investment arbitration would be used less often against law-abiding, democratic countries.
To test this hypothesis, we used the Polity IV index as a proxy for the level of democratic development and the ICRG Law and Order score to assess the strength of the rule of law in host states.​[43]​ We found that, up to the mid-1990s, our data indeed provide some support for the idea that investment arbitration served to replace the domestic courts of non-democratic countries with unpredictable governments (see Fig. 7). Yet, in the mid-to-late 1990s, when investment arbitration claims became more frequent, the situation shifted somewhat. Since then, investment arbitrations have been filed against governments exhibiting, on average, a relatively high level of democratic development and rule of law (the upper third in the case of Polity IV and the upper half for Law and Order).​[44]​ The plausibility of the ‘substituting for the domestic rule of law’ candidate theory is therefore lower for the post-late-1990s period, inasmuch as we consider investment arbitration globally, as a whole. Yet, over time there has been an increasing tendency toward a skewed distribution of cases, with some clustering at the bottom and upper echelons of the level of democratic government and rule of law. It thus remains plausible that substituting for the domestic rule of law remains a function of certain arbitrations,  that one important part of investment arbitration still seeks to replace courts in non-rule-of-law countries, while another important part of investment arbitration targets countries with a high level of respect for the rule of law. In other words, for the post-late-1990s period our data may suggest a dualizing of the function of investment arbitration.


Fig. 7: Yearly average of Polity and Law & Order scores of host states, by year of filing (three-year moving average).

In sum, the hypothesis that investment arbitration provides the rule of law that national courts fail to provide in certain countries seems relatively clear for the period preceding the mid-1990s, but it seems to be a less accurate representation of investment arbitration, taken as a whole, since the late 1990s. 
To get more traction on this issue, we conducted a deeper statistical analysis,​[45]​ focusing on the 1995–-2010 period because the vast majority of investment arbitrations were filed during that period. We tested the link between either the Polity score or the Law and Order score and the variation in the frequency of the number of arbitration claims per year for the set of countries (102) that have faced an investment claim at least once during that time interval (in total using 1,024 country/year observations). We find that the number of claims per country per year is correlated with both indices, but that the significance of this link is not very strong.​[46]​ The correlation signs do correspond to the trends in Figure 7: that is, Polity scores have unexpectedly a positive relation with the number of claims per country/year, whereas Law and Order has a negative relation with the number of claims per country/year. Thus, investment arbitration creates at best a weak rule-of-law effect for countries with a poor record of respect for the rule of law, if we use the Law and Order score as the most relevant indicator.

5	Strengthening the International Rule of Law
The third account of the functional effects of investment arbitration is that it serves to strengthen the rule of law on a global scale: the international rule of law. The rule of law has a rather specific meaning in this context, which must be articulated in order to steer clear of a possible misunderstanding of what exactly we are investigating.
In a nutshell, definitions of the rule of law put forward by legal theorists and philosophers range from the Rechtsstaat mentioned and used earlier (government acting through and in accordance with law)​[47]​ to the realization of the ‘social, economic, educational, and cultural conditions under which man’s legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realized’,​[48]​ and include the Etat de droit (government legally guaranteeing fundamental, constitutional rights​[49]​), the protection of individual moral and political rights,​[50]​ democratic government,​[51]​ and formal legality.​[52]​ It is in the last meaning, as formal legality, that the rule of law is used in the current discussion. Put succinctly, formal legality requires that rules, in order collectively to amount to legal rules and thus instantiate the rule of law, be set out and applied in such ways as to meet a certain threshold of predictability, which is not clearly definable.​[53]​ This implies, for instance, that rules be formulated in general terms, that they be accessible and understandable by their addressees, and that they be applied coherently, consistently, competently, and impartially. Radically simplified, the point of the rule of law as formal legality is to provide what Lon Fuller calls ‘dependable guideposts for self-directed action’.​[54]​

A Providing Guideposts and Determining Rights
So the hypothesis here is that the functional effects of investment arbitration are to sustain or increase the predictability of the international investment regime by providing a forum where the rules are applied in a cognitively reliable way through competent and impartial adjudication. 
This hypothesis is in line with the view, expressed for instance by Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, that investment tribunals contribute to ‘a body of global administrative law that guides State behavior’: that they help to define ‘the world standards of good governance and of the rule of law that are enforceable against [states] by foreign investors’.​[55]​ Investment arbitration, then, is ‘not only a mechanism to settle disputes’ but ‘also a form of global governance’.​[56]​ José Alvarez elaborates: the rules governing foreign investments are ‘becoming increasingly precise over time, not only as a result of ever more detailed provisions in treaty and national law, but also thanks to the ever more elaborate interpretations of relevant law rendered by international arbitrators sitting in investor-state disputes’.​[57]​ These rules now constitute, he continues, a ‘considerable body of law around the once threadbare principles governing States responsibility for injuries to aliens and their property’.​[58]​ With each arbitral decision, Charles Brower and Lee Steven chime in, ‘the rule of law will be realized, and thus strengthened for the future’.​[59]​ For Thomas Wälde, investment arbitration was meant as one of the post-war efforts to ‘create equal rules for all’.​[60]​
If the hypothesis is correct, two empirical manifestations can be expected. First, one would expect claims to be filed more or less indiscriminately against states with high and low development status. A plausibility probe would support the idea that the system serves to create guideposts for all if it showed that everyone is targeted by the system. Secondly, the guideposts for self-directed action created by the regime are stronger if the settlement rate is lower: the function of strengthening the international rule of law is better served if a smaller proportion of cases settle.​[61]​ Indeed, settlements do not instantiate the rule of law, or at best they do so to a much lesser extent than decisions, because in settlement no rules are applied properly speaking.​[62]​ (Rules are of course not completely inoperative in settlements, as they cast their proverbial shadow over negotiations,​[63]​ but their controlling effect on the outcome is much lower.) 
As Figures 4 and 6 have shown, our data provide some evidence to support the idea that these two expected manifestations did occur, in the mid-to-late 1990s. We can see a shift, at that time, from claims being filed more often against developing states to a situation where claims are filed roughly equally against developing and developed states. Moreover, we see a decline of the settlement rate occurring between the early 1990s and 1998. 

B The Haves and the Have-Nots: The Mood Remains Subjunctive
The story so far has ignored one possibility: that investment arbitration serves no functional effects at all. It would only serve the direct function of resolving cases.​[64]​ If a dispute settlement system serves only its immediate function of resolving cases, it is entirely the plaything of the parties, because the parties, and nothing beyond, define the realm of its concern. From this perspective, legal mandates and other legal norms coming to expression in individual determinations could vary between two otherwise indistinguishable situations, because the sole objective of the system would be each case taken for itself, not the way it relates to like cases. Given as much, such a system could easily admit of discriminations between groups of addressees. For instance, the haves and the have-nots could come out of the dispute settlement system differently; they could have different winning rates. 
If, on the other hand, a dispute settlement system fully serves the function of promoting the rule of law, then the way in which cases relate to like cases becomes a predominant concern. A regime would have to produce sufficiently similar results for all parties in order to be in accord with that logic. The legal norms coming to expression in individual determinations cannot vary between two otherwise indistinguishable situations. The rule of law entails the principle of equality before the law. The haves and the have-nots would have to have sufficiently similar winning rates. 
This dichotomous sketch should not obscure the fact that functional effects obtain by degrees: a dispute settlement system more or less serves the strengthening of the international rule of law. Investment arbitration more or less pursues the objective of promoting the international rule of law. The question, of course, is how much or to what extent. 
The answer, it seems, is as follows: investment arbitration serves to promote the international rule of law to a relatively limited extent. We base this statement on the observation of the winning rates of the host states, associated with their economic development status (World Bank metric). Three reasons explain the choice of this indicator. 
First, as explained above, a systematic prevalence of stronger parties (the ‘haves’) is taken to correspond to the hypothesis that the rule of law is pursued less diligently, insofar as any prevalence of such a type of parties is symptomatic of an unequal application of the legal regime. Secondly, the strength of the host states (the extent of their ‘haves’ character, as it were) is taken to be a function of their economic development status, based on the assumption that the richer a state is the better the legal counsel is it can afford. Thirdly, we focus on host states because of the roughly comparable number of cases filed against high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, and low income states (Fig. 3), which sharply contrasts with the overwhelming majority of high income countries among home states (Fig. 2).​[65]​ 
Our data (Fig. 8) show that the haves – the host states with a higher development status – stand a higher chance of successfully fending off claims than the have-nots, the weaker parties with a lower development status. Economic power disparities seem to be a factor of success.

Fig. 8: Percentage of claims won​[66]​ by host states (legal definition of success​[67]​), out of the claims that were filed against states of each economic development status (high income=HI, upper-middle income=UMI, lower-middle income=LMI, lower income=LI) and that were concluded,​[68]​ by year of filing 
(ten-year moving average).​[69]​





Fig. 9: Percentage of claims won by host states, during the periods 1972-2010 and 1998-2010 (same definition of success as Fig. 8)
This means that in the 1998–2010 period, high income countries were 1.7 times more successful in investment arbitrations than low income countries. The richest countries are almost twice as strong as the poorest countries in what appears to be the current incarnation of the investment arbitration regime.​[70]​ When a dispute settlement system favours the stronger parties to such an extent, the international rule of law is pursued less than fully.​[71]​ 

6	Conclusion
Three main views structure a significant part of the thinking about the purposes and effects of investment arbitration. It is seen as serving to control developing countries by acting as a neo-colonial instrument for developed states, or to substitute for the domestic rule of law in the host state of the investment, or to strengthen the international rule of law.
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